We examine the quantitative impact of the Federal Reserve's mortgagebacked securities (MBS) purchase program. We focus on how much of the recent decline in mortgage interest rate spreads can be attributed to these purchases. The question is more difficult than frequently perceived because of simultaneous changes in prepayment and default risks. When we control for these risks, we find evidence of statistically insignificant or small effects of the program. For specifications where the existence or announcement of the program appears to have lowered spreads, we find no separate effect of the size of the stock of MBS purchased by the Fed. These programs were introduced with the explicit aim of reducing mortgage interest rates.
Following the steep decline in house prices throughout 2007 and 2008 , and the associated crisis in the financial system, the Federal Reserve introduced several programs with the aim of stabilizing the housing market. Most significantly it established a program to purchase mortgagebacked securities (MBS) that were guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government sponsored enterprises (GSE) with this role. The program was set up with an initial limit of $500bn, but was later expanded to $1.25 trillion. The Fed also created a program to buy GSE-debt-initially up to $100bn and later expanded to $200bn-and a program to purchase $300bn of medium-term Treasury securities. The Fed's MBS purchases came on top of an earlier announced Treasury MBS purchase program.
These programs were introduced with the explicit aim of reducing mortgage interest rates.
1 Figure 1 shows both primary and secondary mortgage interest rates spreads over Treasury * We would like to thank Jim Dignan, Peter Frederico, Frank Nothaft and Josie Smith for helpful comments. 1 The Press Release on November 25, 2008 announcing the MBS-purchase and GSE-debt purchase programs stated that "This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally." yields during the financial crisis. Primary mortgage rates are the rates that are paid by the individual borrower. They are based on the secondary market rate but also include a fee for the GSE insurance, a servicing spread to cover the cost of the mortgage servicer, and an originator spread. returned to their long-run average-or slightly below that average-and then did not move significantly further. Two related questions about these movements in mortgage spreads are 2 The primary market mortgage rate series comes from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey, which surveys lenders each week on the rates and points for their most popular 30-year fixed-rate, 15-year fixed-rate, 5/1 hybrid amortizing adjustable-rate, and 1-year amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage products. The secondary market mortgage is the Fannie Mae MBS 30 Year Current Coupon. The spreads are created by subtracting the yield on 10-year treasuries from both series. The maturity difference between these series captures the fact that most 30-year mortgages are paid-off or refinanced before their maturity. Determining whether central banks have the ability to affect pricing of mortgage securities for extended periods is important input into the debate about the role, responsibilities and powers of central banks (see, for example, the collection of essays on this subject in Ciorciari and Taylor, 2009 ).
Conventional Wisdom About the Impact of the MBS Purchase Program
A common perception is that the MBS purchase program has been successful in reducing 
Controlling for Prepayment Risk
Mortgage-backed securities are structured products that are collateralized by residential mortgages. Most of these mortgages entail a prepayment option by the individual borrower, which gives the borrower the right to prepay the mortgage at any time prior to the maturity of the loan, and thereby to refinance at a favorable rate. This prepayment option gives mortgage-backed securities characteristics similar to those of a callable bond in which the issuer has the right to redeem prior to its maturity date (Windas, 1996) . Pricing of a mortgage-backed security thus proceeds by modeling it as a combination of (1) a long position in a non-callable bond and (2) a short position in a prepayment option. The combined valuation of those two parts determines the secondary market yield of MBS.
The value of the prepayment option is determined using standard option-pricing tools, where the value of the option depends on expected movements in the short-term interest ratehigher volatility in the interest rate will increase the value of the option, since it will increase the probability of states in which prepayment becomes optimal. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) is a common way for investors and traders to take account of the prepayment risk. The OAS is the spread of the MBS over a term structure of alternative interest rates after controlling for the value of the prepayment option. A summary of the OAS calculation is provided in the appendix.
Given these considerations we focus on the impact of the MBS purchase program on the
OAS. An advantage of the OAS is that the measure directly controls for prepayment risk without adding control variables in the statistical analysis. We also examine the impact on the primary and secondary market spreads shown in Figures 1 and 2 , but in this case it is necessary control for prepayment risk indirectly by including other terms in the regressions, such as the implied volatility of Treasury yields obtained from options on those securities, 4 as in Lehnert, Passmore and Sherlund (2006) . Higher volatility in Treasury yields would increase prepayment risk and thus the primary or secondary mortgage interest rate spread.
3.

Controlling for Default Risk
Controlling for default risk of GSE-insured MBS is necessary to ensure that the decline in mortgage spreads in 2009 was not driven by a decline in default risk. Finding a good measure for default risk, however, is not easy.
In the case of GSE-insured MBS, the default risk is related to the default risk of the underlying mortgages as well as to the potential of the insuring GSE being unable to meet its guarantee obligations. The ability to fulfill its pledge is a function of the health of the housing market and of a number of political factors that determine whether the government would eventually act as a backstop to GSE-issued guarantees. A good measure of the default risk of GSE-insured MBS is the credit default swap (CDS) series on GSE-debt. When there is an increased risk of default of agency-debt, as measured by higher costs for CDS on that debt, the risk that the GSEs will not be able to fulfill their insurance pledge increases, and secondary market spreads on agency-insured MBS will increase. Unfortunately, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship on September 7, 2008 was a trigger-event for outstanding CDS so the data series stops at that time, and, to our knowledge, no new CDS series have emerged since then that would allow us to directly measure GSE default risk. . For the time-period that the two series co-exist, they are highly correlated, which suggests that the bond spread series is a good control for the default risk of GSE-insured MBS. 
Figure 4: GSE bond spreads vs. GSE CDS
A complicating factor however is that in late 2008 the Fed also embarked on a program to purchase agency debt. While these interventions capture a much smaller fraction of the market than the purchases of agency-insured MBS, they may contaminate the usefulness of bond spreads as a pure measure of agency default risk during this period. To deal with this problem we take two approaches.
First, we instrument for the bond spread series with three instrumental variables: the level of the Case-Shiller house price index, the month-on-month change in this index, and Moody's AAA bond index 8 . (We interpolate the monthly Case-Shiller index data to get the weekly observations.) A lower level of the house price index and a large month-on-month decline in the index should indicate a higher degree of mortgage risk. Falling house prices will push borrowers into negative home equity, increasing their incentives for strategic default, and thus increasing the risk of mortgage default. The Moody's AAA bond index captures the general degree of riskiness in the credit markets. Because these instruments are unlikely to be affected by government purchases of GSE-debt and are highly correlated with the bond spread (the first stage regression has an F-Statistic of 141.16), they are good instruments in our view. In addition, beyond its effect through capturing increased risk in the housing credit market, neither of the instruments should have a dramatic effect on the default probability of GSE-debt -thus the exclusion restrictions are likely to be met.
Second, we use the spreads of Fannie Mae's Subordinated Benchmark note series to proxy for credit risk. Since the Fed's GSE-debt purchases are focused on the senior debt market, these are less likely to have contaminated this subordinated debt as a proxy of risk. Fannie Mae started issuing subordinated debt in 2001, with the expressed goal of "enhancing market discipline, transparency and capital adequacy." The subordinated debt series is unsecured and ranks junior in priority of payment to all senior creditors, so "investors considering investing in these securities need to closely monitor Fannie Mae's financial strength, safety and soundness" (Fannie Mae, 2001 ). Since MBS guarantees rank pari passu to senior bonds, the subordinated debt will only be repaid if the MBS insurances issued are fulfilled. This means that an increase in the subordinated debt spreads could signal an increase in the probability of default for the GSEinsured MBS, and thus the secondary market mortgage interest rates. The downside of looking at the subordinated debt series is its very small volume, which is usually around $1bn per issuance, and not comparable in liquidity to the senior GSE bonds. Therefore, the pricing of these securities may conflate liquidity elements with credit risk elements. As discussed above, the option-adjusted spread is measured against a term structure of interest rates. The predicted prepayment cash-flows associated with the MBS are discounted back to the present using this term structure, and the OAS is the number of basis points that the discount curve needs to be adjusted upwards until the theoretical price calculated using the "adjusted term structure" matches the market price of the security. It is common to use the LIBOR swap curve for this purpose. LIBOR swap rates are the most appropriate discount rate for most financial market actors, since portfolio managers need to balance mortgage investments with other non-government investments. The Swap curve provides a measure of the opportunity cost of most investors. For example, Fabozzi and Mann (2001) argue that "funded investors use LIBOR as their benchmark interest rate. Most funded investors borrow at a spread over LIBOR.
Consequently, if a yield curve for LIBOR is used as the benchmark interest rate, the OAS reflects a spread relative to their funding costs." Figure 6 shows the OAS using the swap curve, which we call Swap-OAS, along with the primary mortgage market spread. Note that the Swap-OAS has the same general pattern as the primary mortgage spread, but the gap between them narrows and then widens again over the sample period. The OAS can also be calculated using the Treasury spot curve rather than the LIBOR swap curve for the term structure. Treasury rates and LIBOR have different liquidity and risk characteristics and these varied considerably during the financial crisis as Treasury rates deviated significantly from LIBOR due in part to a "flight to quality." (Smith, 2009; Taylor and Williams, 2008) . We consider this alternative measure, which we call Treasury-OAS, 10 as well as the Swap-OAS and in our analysis.
In Tables 1 and 2 we report the impact of MBS purchases on the Swap-OAS. We use the GSE bond spread series discussed in Section 3 as a measure of the underlying default risk in Table 1 and subordinated debt spreads in Table 2 . Recall that we do not need to proxy for volatility, because prepayment risk is already removed from the OAS series. Observe in Table 1 that the OAS moves closely with the bond spread, just as theory would predict. However, the coefficient on the MBS purchase volume is of the wrong sign and sometimes insignificant. There is no evidence that the increase in the MBS purchases led to a reduction in mortgage interest rate spreads using this conventional OAS measure. The regressions in Table 2 control for default risk using the subordinated debt series.
Here the coefficients on the MBS purchases have the correct sign, but are quite small and sometimes statistically insignificant. For example, the coefficient on total MBS purchases in column (1) suggests that a purchase of $500 billion in MBS (approximately 10% of the market)
would reduce the Swap-OAS by about 4 basis points. Accordingly, the actual total purchases of larger and more significant effect of the MBS purchases on the Treasury-OAS. The differences in the parameter estimates using the Swap-OAS and the Treasury-OAS are driven by movements of the Treasury term structure relative to the swap-curve term structure over the sample period. To understand these differences, it is useful to consider the residuals of regressions of Swap-OAS and Treasury-OAS on the bond spread series (the risk indicator), without including the MBS purchases as an explanatory variable. Figure 7 shows the residuals from such a Swap-OAS regression along with the actual and predicted Swap-OAS series over the sample period.
Notice that the residuals through this whole period remain evenly spread around zero.
Movements in prepayment risk (as measured by Swap-OAS) and default risk (measure by agency debt spreads) explain the major movements in mortgage spreads. Little remains to be explained by the MBS purchases. This explains why the coefficient on MBS purchases is very small in the regressions. Rather, it appears as if there was a single downward shift in residuals near the beginning of the MBS purchase program without a further effect from increasing purchases.
To formalize this graphical analysis mathematically, we consider OLS regressions which include a dummy variable for whether or not there was an MBS purchase program along with the variable for the volume of purchases. The results are shown in Table 5 . Columns (1) through (3) are the swap OAS regressions corresponding to three different dummy variables: In each regression the dummy is set to 0 at the start of the sample period and then increased to 1 at a later date. In column (1) spreads were positive suggests that market participants attached some likelihood to the government not bailing out Fannie and Freddie (in addition to some differences in the liquidity of the two instruments). By directly purchasing GSE-debt and GSE-insured MBS, the Fed increased its own financial exposure to the GSEs, increasing the perception that the guarantee was explicit. However, if this were the channel through which the MBS-purchases and GSE-debt purchases affected mortgage spreads, a significantly more straightforward way to achieve the same goal would be to extend, formally and explicitly, the full faith and credit of the United
States to Fannie and Freddie, in a similar fashion as it is already extended to Ginnie Mae.
Regression Results with Primary and Secondary Market Mortgage Spreads
In this section we report the results from the regression analysis using the primary or secondary mortgage interest rate spread as a dependent variable. As discussed above since these spreads are not adjusted for prepayment risk it is necessary use some proxy for prepayment risk in the regression, and we use the implied volatility of Treasury yields obtained from options. A residual analysis similar to that for the OAS for primary and secondary market mortgage spreads
shows that the volume of purchases has little or no additional effect beyond the existence of the program. Therefore, we simply use program dummies and estimate the size and quantitative significance of the program. Table 6 examines the primary mortgage spread using the GSE bond spread series as the proxy for default risk. Observe that higher GSE bond spreads, indicating larger MBS default risk, are associated with higher primary mortgage spreads. The regression coefficient is reasonably close to unity. A higher implied volatility, the prepayment risk proxy, is also associated with higher mortgage interest rates, as predicted by the theory. The coefficients on the various program dummies are small and often statistically insignificant. The regressions in Table 7 show the effects of purchases on primary mortgage rates, but control for the GSE-default risk with the subordinated debt spread rather than the senior GSEdebt spread. Using this risk measure, we obtain estimates of the effects of MBS purchase program which are similar in size to the case of Treasury OAS-a reduction of the primary mortgage rate spread of approximately 30bps due to the MBS purchase program. Finally, Tables 8 and 9 show the impact of MBS purchases on secondary mortgage spreads. These are the secondary market yields on GSE-insured mortgage-backed securities. The effect of MBS purchase program on the secondary market spread shown in Table 8 are slightly higher than the effect on primary market spreads shown in Table 6 . Of all the results reported in this paper the largest effects are Table 9 where we used the subordinated debt as the proxy for risk. Comparing Tables 8 and 9 with Tables 6 and 7 suggests that this reduction in secondary market funding costs for mortgage lenders was only partially passed on to consumers in terms of lower primary mortgage rates. Observe that using the IV approach gives effects of the MBS-purchases of a larger magnitude than the OLS approach o Estimating the impact using indirect methods to control for prepayment risk generally confirms the analysis using OAS, but shows larger effects in the secondary market. The impact of the program on primary market spreads ranges from the wrong sign and insignificant to around 30 basis points. For secondary market rates the impact is larger-in the 30 to 60 basis point range-which corresponds to a less than full pass through of the impact to primary mortgage spreads. In general we find somewhat smaller effects when we control for default risk using senior agency debt than we do with subordinated agency debt or instrumental variables.
We emphasize that analyzing the effectiveness of the MBS purchase program is very difficult. The creation of adequate counterfactuals is complicated by the simultaneous government interventions in a large number of markets. Furthermore, the conservatorship-status of the GSEs has contaminated many of the relevant GSE-default risk proxies that are most important to control for when analyzing the development of spreads on GSE-insured MBS. Our analysis has used a variety of different approaches to proxy for risk, each with its own problems.
However, none of the approaches reported in this paper, nor others we examined -such as CDS-series for the largest mortgage lenders such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citi and JP Morgan -provides evidence that the volume of MBS purchases is contributing in a major way to the decline in mortgage interest rates.
Currently there is a lack of publicly-available statistical studies on the effectiveness of the Fed's program. We note that our estimates of the impact are much smaller than the impacts reported in the recent speech by Sack (2009) . While this paper is certainly not the final word on the program's effectiveness, our empirical results raise questions about the ability of central banks to conduct price-keeping operations reliably by increasing and decreasing asset purchases in particular markets. They also raise doubts about the benefits in terms of lower mortgage interest rates of further increases in the size of the Fed's MBS portfolio or about the costs in terms of higher interest rates of gradually reducing the size of that portfolio.
To show this formally, let {r it } represent the development of interest rates in time t on path i. Let {C it } represent the anticipated cash-flows in each period t on path i. C it is determined using the prepayment model. The present value of the cash-flows for each path i is given by:
The associated value, P E , of the MBS should thus be the (weighted) average of the PVs.
The option-adjusted spread (OAS) is then derived by comparing the market price of an MBS, P M , to P E . In particular, it is calculated as the spread over the term structure that equates the market price to the (weighted) average present value of expected cash flows over all simulated paths. More formally, the OAS is defined as the θ such that:
